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A RETURN TO LOCKERBIE AND THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION IN THE WAKE OF
THE SEPTEMBER 11TH TERRORIST ATTACKS:
RAMIFICATIONS OF PAST SECURITY COUNCIL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ACTION
Jonathan A. Frank*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirteen years after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in December, 1988,' the international community again faces the
challenge of confronting the international legal ramifications surrounding the
extradition and prosecution of alleged international state-sponsored terrorists. As
has been explored in a number of previous works on the subject, United Nations
Security Council actions in response to the Lockerbie bombing created significant
tension between the Security Council and the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"). 2 These tension-producing actions were a response to Libya's attempted
invocation of various articles of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, otherwise known as the Montreal
Convention of 1971.3
* Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. A.M. (Latin American
Studies) Stanford University, 1998. B.A. Carleton College (Spanish Literature, Latin American Studies
Concentration).
1. See generally Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/ (last visited
March 15, 2002) (a site maintained by the University of Glasgow which provides a number of links
related to the Lockerbie bombing as well as news and official documentation regarding the subsequent
trial process).
2. See generally Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some
Constraints, 34 INT'L LAW. 289, 298 (2000); Gerald P. McGinley, The IC.J "s Decision in the
Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 577 (1992); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship
Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case,
88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1994); Deborah D'Angelo, The "Check" on International Peace and Security
Maintenance: The International Court of Justice and Judicial Reeview of Security Council Resolutions,
23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 561 (2000); Eric Zubel, The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension
Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L. & COMP. L.
259 (1999).
3. See Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. See generally http://www.undcp.org/
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Generally speaking, Libya's claims were grounded in the Montreal
Convention's prescription for extradition processes of individuals accused of
committing acts of aviation-related terrorism, 4 as well as for adjudication in the ICJ
in the case of disputes between party states arising from the Montreal Convention.5
The Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers of the United Nations
Charter at the same time as Libya instituted proceedings in the ICJ with respect to
the above and in reference to disputes with the United Kingdom and the United
States.6 Implemented at the urging of the United Kingdom and the United States,
Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992), 883 (1993) and their progeny, built upon
Resolution 731 (1992) and effectively bound Libya to Resolutions 748 and 883's
term. These resolutions had the effect of rendering any ruling of the International
Court of Justice and any further Libyan action subject to the mandates of the
Security Council.
7
terrorism.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); http://www.asil.org/resource/crimi.htm#Terrorism (last
visited Apr. 4, 2002); http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorismrterrorism3a.htm (providing links to general
United Nations materials on terrorism, in addition to international treaties, United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, including the text of the twelve United Nations treaties on
the prevention of terrorism: the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board
Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention", 1963); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft ("Hague Convention", 1970); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention", 1971); the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973); the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages Convention", 1979); the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear Materials Convention", 1980); the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (1988); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988); the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf (1988); Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection (1991); the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution, 1997); the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999)).
4. "It is noteworthy that in Libya's opinion the Montreal Convention applied to 'state' as well as
'ordinary' terrorism." NINA B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES 251 (2000).
5. See Montreal Convention, supra note 3, arts. 8 and 9.
6. See id. at art. 14. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51, available at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm (last visited March 25, 2002). Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter reads: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." For a comprehensive study of the United Nations Security
Council Chapter VII powers, see DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY (1999).
7. See JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 251. See also Peter H.F. Bekker, Questions ofInterpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incidents at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) and (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United States),
Preliminary Objections, Judgments, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 503, 506 (1998) (stating that the International
Court of Justice, by majority, declared that Libya's claim within the Court was rendered "without
object," and therefore moot, in light of Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883); DAngelo, supra
note 2, at 586 (citing to Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie ( Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14), at 145, 180
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This paper will attempt to elucidate upon the United Nations role with respect
to international action taken in response to the tragic terrorist attacks upon the
United States on September 11 th. Furthermore, this paper will attempt to provide
some insight regarding the question of whether states complicit in acts of
international terrorism should have the opportunity to rely on international
conventions as a course of responsive action in the international legal arena; prior
to Security Council or unilateral State political action initiated under the Security
Council's Chapter VII authority.8
II. LOCKERBIE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
In the aftermath of the Lockerbie bombing, the United Nations played a
significant role in facilitating the extradition of the accused Libyan terrorists for
trial in a neutral state at the behest of the United States and the United Kingdom. 9
During the nearly ten-year negotiation process leading up to the extradition of the
accused terrorists from Libya, the United Nations Security Council, by way of
Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192 (1998), acted aposteriori in a positive manner
with regards to only Libya and not with regards to other states known to harbor,
financially assist, or otherwise support terrorists.' 0 Rather, the Security Council
deferred to the United Nations Charter and General Assembly Resolutions 49/60
(1995) and 51/210 (1997) in its comparatively inert or passive historical "urgings"
to other member and non-member States."
(Bedjaoui, J., dissenting)) [hereinafter the Lockerbie case]; McGinley, supra note 2, at 578; Zubel,
supra note 2, at 269.
8. Thank you to Dr. Omer Y. Elagab, whose paper "The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie
Trial: Some Constraints," provided me with both a departure point and a wealth of informative analysis
which have proved key to the ideas behind the authoring of this article. The question to which I am
referring is put forth by Dr. Elagab as follows: "[t]he question to be addressed, however, is whether
there are exceptional circumstances in which the option of prosecution should be denied to the state that
is complicitous in acts of terrorism." See Elagab, supra note 2, at 298. (Additionally, Dr. Elagab points
out that this was an issue that counsel for both the United States and the United Kingdom broached in
their respective remarks in International Court of Justice Oral Hearings with regard to the Lockerbie
Case).
9. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001) available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1373e.pdf. See also U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe SC17158, Press
Release, United Nations, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism
Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation (Sept. 28, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C.
Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/731 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
sc/res/1992/s92r731e.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/748
(1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r748e.pdf (last visited Mar. I, 2002);
S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe. S/Res/883 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/docs/
scres/1993/883e.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/I 192
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1998/sresl 192.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
10. See Michael P. Scharf, Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie Criminal Proceedings, 6 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 355, 356 (2000). See also Elagab, supra note 2, at 291-94 (Dr. Elagab points out that
the Security Council demanded that the government of Libya comply with Resolutions 731, 748 and
883, making it clear that Libya was the sole subject of these Resolutions.).
II. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, at 1, para. 4; see also U.N. CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 2,
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The distinction between general directives of the Security Council aimed at
combating international terrorism and specific action taken (e.g., the imposition of
sanctions or authorization of the use of force) in response to individual acts of
international terrorism, such as Lockerbie and the September 11 th attacks, is an
important one insofar as attempting to discern a pattern of Security Council
behavior and decision-making in response to international terrorist attacks.
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 served to preempt Libya's lawful and
timely claim for provisional measures that would have allowed for ICJ proceedings
on the question of extradition in that case without the imposition upon Libya of
United Nations Security Council sanctions. 2 Resolutions 883 and 1192 served to
further strengthen and solidify the terms set forth in Resolutions 731 and 748.1
3
Libya's argument to the ICJ, grounded in the Montreal Convention, plainly
contended that Libya was not bound to extradite her own nationals in the absence
of a bilateral extradition treaty with either the United States or the United
Kingdom.' 4 The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731,
748, 883 and 1192 illustrated the shortcomings of the Montreal Convention in
dealing with the extradition of state-sponsored terrorists insofar as the principle of
aut dedere aut judicare.'5 The Montreal Convention simply does not address
situations in which a state is complicitous in a terrorist action.' 6  Furthermore,
these Resolutions arguably established a precedent that the Security Council would
act when necessary, and to the limits of its power, especially when such politically
influential states as the United Kingdom and the United States are involved, to
bypass the tenets of the Montreal Convention in situations where a State refuses to
extradite her own ostensibly state-sponsored terrorist nationals for trial under the
laws of the State in which the act of terrorism was carried out.1
7
In the intervening period between the Lockerbie bombing and the eventual
extradition of the accused Libyan terrorists to a neutral third-party country, Libya
refused all demands from both the United States and the United Kingdom for
extradition of the alleged terrorist pair who were also found to be Libyan
nationals. 8 In the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty between either Libya
para. 4 (establishing a duty on behalf of all states to not assist or participate in terrorist activities); G.A.
Res. 60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/60 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51" Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/51/a5Ir2I0.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002) (delineating the United Nations General Assembly position on measures to
eliminate international terrorism).
12. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 305; see also D'Angelo, supra note 2, at 583-91.
13. See S.C. Res. 731 (1992), S.C. Res. 748 (1992), S.C. Res. 883 (1993) and S.C. Res. 1192
(1998), supra note 9.
14. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 3.
15. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that the principle of aut dedere autjudicare means
"either surrender or prosecute"); see also Elagab, supra note 2, at 306.
16. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 3.
17. See generally S.C. Res. 731, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748 supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 883
supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at 1.
18. Compare Zubel, supra note 2, at 260 (commenting that both of the accused, Abdel Basset Ali
lal-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah were Libyan intelligence agents), and S.C. Res. 731 supra
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and the United States, or Libya and the United Kingdom, Libya sought to rely on
the articles of the Montreal Convention pertaining to extradition as the basis of its
argument.' 9 Although there is generally not considered to be any international
customary law pertaining to acts of international terrorism, the Montreal
Convention was, and to an extent still is, one of the primary governing
Conventions of extradition of accused individuals for acts of aerial terrorism.
20
According to Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, in a situation in which an
accused State is in possession of a terrorist accused of acting abroad, the requested
State(s) must either extradite that individual to the requesting State(s), or "[slubmit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" in accordance
with the appropriate laws of that state.2 1 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Montreal
Convention provides that signatory States may consider the Convention itself the
legal basis for extradition in the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty between
the requesting and the requested states.22 As there existed no extradition treaties
between either the United States and Libya or the United Kingdom and Libya at
the time of the bombings, it follows that Libya had no obligation to extradite its
own nationals under the Montreal Convention.23 Apart from the Montreal
Convention, which does not in and of itself establish a principle of international
customary law, there exists no international law requiring a state to extradite. 4
Under well-established principles of international law, no recourse exists on
behalf of the claiming state(s) for failure of the requested State to extradite unless
such recourse is authorized by the United Nations Security Council against a
United Nations member State.25
The Convention is, however, silent on the issue of extradition of a national
from his own state, where that state itself has been shown to have sponsored one of
26their national's alleged terrorist activities. In this sense, the shortcomings of the
Montreal Convention are necessarily resolved by United Nations Security Council
action with the goal of combating threats against the maintenance of international
peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.27 The extensive
investigation surrounding the Lockerbie case led authorities to the conclusion that
the terrorists responsible for the bombing were Libyan intelligence agents who had
been instructed to blow up Pan Am Flight 103 by individuals directly linked to the
note 9, para. 6 at I (mentioning "investigations which implicate officials of the Libyan Government").
19. See Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art 5.
20. See generally id. at 1-5; see also Elagab supra note 2, at 301; GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF
EXTRADITION LAW 8 (1991).
21. Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 7.
22. Id. art.8.
23. Elagab, supra note 2, at 296, 300 (Elagab comments that extradition is a "a sovereign decision
of the requested State, which is never under an obligation to carry it out." In this respect, the Montreal
Convention does conform to the customary international law as it stood when the Convention was
drafted and put in force).
24. See Elagab supra note 2, at 300-01; see also GILBERT supra note 15, at 8.
25. See Elagab supra note 2, at 301.
26. Montreal Convention, supra note 3.
27. See U.N. Charter, supra note 6, arts. 39-5 1.
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Libyan government. 28 The United States and the United Kingdom realized this
deficiency of the Montreal Convention in terms of forcing the extradition of a
state-sponsored terrorist from his own country of citizenship, and pursued other
avenues in an attempt to compel Libya to extradite the accused terrorists, namely
through the levying of sanctions via United Nations Security Council Resolutions
passed under Chapter VII authority.29
Approximately two months after Security Council Resolution 731 was passed,
the first such Resolution urging Libya to extradite the alleged terrorists, Libya filed
suit in the ICJ seeking provisional measures to effectively delay or prohibit the
implementation of sanctions by the United Nations until the matter of Libya's
argument per the Montreal Convention was decided.30 The reasoning behind the
United States and the United Kingdom's strategy to seek a remedy through the
Security Council was arguably founded in part on the premise established by
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, which reads: "The Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the Present Charter."31 In effect, the Resolutions passed by the
Security Council, in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter,
preempted any injunctive action by the International Court of Justice as Libya is a
permanent member of the United Nations and therefore bound to adhere to United
Nations Security Council Resolutions. 32 The ICJ ultimately decided that Security
Council Resolution 748 was determinative on the issues presented in Libya's
arguments, and that Libya therefore was obliged, per Article 25 of the Charter, to
comply with that resolution.33 Additionally, the ICJ held that the Court would not
further entertain Libya's arguments premised on the Montreal Convention.34
The language of Security Council Resolutions directed towards Libya, which
followed Resolution 731, became increasingly intense on the issue of extraditing
their nationals accused of committing the terrorist acts which led to the downing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. Resolution 748, adopted on March 31, 1992,
28. See Zubel, supra note 2, at 260 (commenting that both of the accused, Abdel Basset Ali lal-
Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah were Libyan intelligence agents), see also S.C. Res. 731 supra
note 9, para. 6, at I (mentioning "investigations which implicate officials of the Libyan Government").
29. See generally S.C. Res. 73 1, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res.
883, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192, supra note 9, at 1.
30. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15 (Apr. 14)
[hereinafter Request for Indication of Provisional Measures]. Judges voting in favor of the decision
included: Vice President Oda Acting President, President Sir Robert Jennings, Judge Lachs, Judge Ago,
Judge Schwebel, Judge Ni, Judge Evensen, Judge Tarassov, Judge Guillaume, Judge Shahabuddeen,
and Judge Aguilar Mawdsley. Judges voting against the decision included: Judge Bedjaoui, Judge
Weeramantry, Judge Ranjeva, Judge Ajibola, and Judge as hoc EI-Kosheri., 1992 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Apr. 14)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). See also Case Conceming Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 115 (Feb. 27) (preliminary objections).
31. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25; see also D'Angelo supra note 2, at 567-77.
32. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 305; see also D'Angelo supra note 2, at 583-91.
33. See generally Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30; Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.S., supra note 30.
34. 1998 I.C.J. 9, 105 (Feb. 27).
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levied sanctions against Libya in consideration of that country's failure to accede
to the repeated requests of the alleged terrorists' extradition by both the United
States and the United Kingdom.35 Security Council Resolutions 883 and 1192
further attempted to pressure the Libyan government by demanding compliance
with the previous two Resolutions and strengthening the sanctions against that
country.36 With the possibility of seeking recourse in the ICJ gone, international
pressure increasing, and United Nations sanctions taking their toll, Libya
eventually capitulated to a long-debated plan to have the alleged terrorists
extradited to the Netherlands to be tried by a Scottish Court.3 7
III. LOCKERBIE SEPARATE OPINIONS AND DISSENTS:
Disagreement on the Competing Roles of the United Nations Security Council and
the International Court of Justice
The question now raised by Libya's challenge to the validity of resolution 748
(1992) is whether a decision of the Security Council may override the legal rights
of States, and, if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the Council
to characterize a situation as one justifying the making of a decision entailing such
consequences. Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In
the equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within
the evolving international order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a
legal issue may properly arise as to the Competence of the Security Council to
produce such overriding results? If there are any limits, what are those limits and
what body, if other than the Security Council, is competent to say what those limits
are?
If the answers to these delicate and complex questions are all in the negative,
the position is potentially curious. It would not, on that account, be necessarily
unsustainable in law; and how far the Court can enter the field is another
matter.... 38
At the provisional measures 39 stage of the "Case Concerning Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the
35. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, para. 6, at I (indicating that Libya's failure to comply with
demands for extradition constituted a "threat to international peace and security").
36. See S.C. Res. 883 supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at I; see also U.N.
CHARTER art.7, para. 1-2.
37. See Scharf supra note 2, at 357-58 (outlining the specific arrangements involved in the
extradition of the then alleged Libyan terrorists to stand trial in the Netherlands before a Scottish panel
ofjudges).
38. See Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 28 (separate opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen).
39. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41, para. 1-2, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicsdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (stating "I. The Court
shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final decision,
notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.")
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Aerial Incident at Lockerbie," eleven ICJ justices voted in favor of the Court's
decision to deny Libya's request for provisional measures, and five ICJ justices
voted against the majority decision.40  Libya's request for provisional measures
were based on that State's contention that the United Kingdom was violating
Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(2) and 11 of the Montreal Convention, acting to abridge
Libya's rights, and that the United Kingdom was under an international legal
obligation to refrain from doing so.41  In its decision with regard to Libya's
request, the ICJ based its denial of provisional measures in part on the passage of
Security Council Resolution 748, in which the Security Council effectively
invoked it's Chapter VII powers and bound Libya to that Resolution, leaving the
majority of the ICJ of the opinion that Libya's request for provisional measures
was then moot.
4 2
While by no means a focus of the work at hand, the issues presented to the
ICJ by Libya's application for provisional measures in light of concurrent Security
Council action was nothing novel. 43 The Lockerbie case has now long served as a
source for commentary regarding the function of the ICJ with respect to the
Security Council, as well as being a source of speculation regarding Security
Council ultra vires actions.44 The Lockerbie case has also been a source of
argument for judicial review of Security Council Resolutions by the ICJ.
45
40. See Request for Indication of Provisional Measures., supra note 30.
41. See id. at 6-7. See also Montreal Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5, 7, 8 and 11.
42. See generally S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9. See also Request for Provisional Measures, supra
note 30, at 15 (stating as one of the reasons in the Order for the Court's denial of Libya's request for
provisional measures, "[w]hereas, furthermore, an indication of the measures requested by Libya would
be likely to impair the rights which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue
of Security Resolution 748 (1992)). See also S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, para. 5 (The Security Council
invokes it's Chapter VII powers by stating "(d]etermining in this context that the failure of the Libyan
Government to demonstrate, by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its
continued failure to respond filly and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992), constitute a
threat to international peace and security...").
43. Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 20 (declaration of Judge Ni).
44. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1996)
(stating that a finding of ultra vires action by the Security Council on the part of the International Court
of Justice could have fundamentally changed the UN system of governance); Geoffrey R. Watson,
Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and The World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 2 (1993); Marcella
David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the
World Court, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 90-91 (1999) (stating that ultra vires Security Council action was
not at issue in the Lockerbie case, because the International Court of Justice assumed a valid obligation
[to the applicable Security Council Resolutions] on the states involved); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of
the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: Un Humanitarian
Intervention in the Post Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 12 (1995); D'Angelo, supra
note 2, at 586.
45. See generally Takane Sugihara, The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice
with Respect to Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 125 (A.S. Muller, D. Raid and J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997);
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
Judicial Function, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS
125 (A.S. Muller, D. Raid and J.M. Thur-Anszky eds., 1997); Alain Pellet, Address at the Proceedings of
the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary
of the Court (April 1996), in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 234-53
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Building upon other contentious ICJ cases, such as the Hostages case4 6 and the
Nicaragua case47, the opinions of the ICJ in the Lockerbie case, specifically
Libya's request for the indication of provisional measures, 48 provide important
insight into the problematic political-judicial dynamic between the Court and the
Security Council. 49 As evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the Lockerbie
case, both the ICJ and the Security Council can be confronted by the same
situation. However, because of this political-judicial dynamic, the two organs can
come to conflicting decisions - decisions that, despite their political or judicial
foundations, each have distinct judicial and political affects upon the countries
involved.50
Given the geopolitical context in which Libya made its request for the
indication of provisional measures to the ICJ, the question thus becomes which
organ should have the power to make the ultimate decisions regarding the rights of
sovereign states where the prevention or punishment of state-sponsored
international terrorism is at issue. To that end, this section is not meant by any
means as a defense to States which sponsor, endorse or espouse international
terrorist activities or tactics - all of which the author strongly believes to be
heinous and deplorable criminal acts. Those individuals or States found guilty of
which, deserve the harshest penalties allowed under applicable law. Rather, this
section is meant to pose the political-legal question of what lengths can a Security
Council member State, or States, go in order to legally invoke Security Council
Chapter VII powers without encroaching upon the sovereign rights of the State
accused of sponsoring acts of international terrorism.
As illustrated by the Lockerbie case, when situations of alleged state-
sponsored terrorism are involved and the Security Council invokes its Chapter VII
powers, the possibility for conflict between the Security Council and the ICJ
becomes troublesome. As was stated in the Court's ruling in the Nicaragua case:
(Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Address at the Proceedings of the
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 5 0
h Anniversary of
the Court (April 1996), in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 254-66
(Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: The
International Court of Justice and Its Powers of Judicial Review, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 281 (1995);
John Quigley, The United Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage, 35
TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (2000); Alvarez, supra note 44; Mcginley, supra note 2; D'Angelo, supra note 2;
Watson, supra note 44; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 2.
46. See generally United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24) [hereinafter the Hostages case].
47. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 1.C.J. 14
(June 27) [hereinafter the Nicaragua Case].
48. See generally Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 33.
49. See Shaw, supra note 45, at 243 (citing the Courts decision in the Nicaragua case, supra note
47 at 435, Shaw includes the following quote: "the Council has functions of a political nature assigned
to it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events.").
50. See Sugihara, supra note 45, at 126; Shaw, supra note 45, at 232-36. See also Alvarez, supra
note 44, at 10 (stating that some have criticized Security Council actions as amounting to "'quasi
judicial "'actions).
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[u]ntil the Security Council makes a determination under Article 39, a dispute
remains to be dealt with by the methods of peaceful settlement provided under
Article 33, including judicial settlement; and even after a determination under
Article 39, there is no necessary inconsistency between Security Council action
and adjudication by the Court. From a juridical standpoint, the decisions of the
Court and the actions of the Security Council are entirely separate.
5 1
While Security Council resolutions and decisions of the ICJ pertaining to the
same issue may not be mutually exclusive, it has been hypothesized that Security
action may actually infringe upon the rights of a sovereign state. As illustrated by
the Lockerbie case, the Council invoked it's Chapter VII powers in Resolution 748.
From one perspective, thus blocked Libya from obtaining the imposition of
provisional measures against the United Kingdom in the International Court of
Justice pursuant to the Montreal Convention. 52  This perspective appears as a
recurring theme throughout the Separate Opinions and Dissents of the five judges
who voted against the International Court's Order with regard to Libya's request
for the indication of provisional measures. 53 A survey of several of these separate
opinions and dissents serve as an appropriate framework from which to discern
competing arguments and begin to form some hypotheses with regard to the future
invocation of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council in order to combat state-
sponsored international terrorism.
Judge Lachs' separate opinion, the first and shortest opinion to be appended
to the Court's Order, perhaps speaks most clearly to the multifaceted questions
being broached by this article. In calling for harmonious action between the two
entities of the United Nations which "[hlave the delivery of binding decisions
explicitly included in their powers under the Charter," Judge Lachs comments that
"[i]t [the International Court of Justice] is its [international law's] principle
guardian. Now, it has become clear that the dividing line between political and
legal disputes is blurred, as law becomes ever more frequently an integral element
of international controversies.
54
While couched in very diplomatic wording calling for cooperation between
the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, Judge Lach's most
important commentary is that concerning the dichotomy between that which is
51. See supra note 45, at 125 (citing to the Nicaragua case). See also U.N. Charter, art. 39 supra
note 6; U.N. Charter, art. 33 supra note 6 (Article 33 of the UN Charter reads as follows: "I. The
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.").
52. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9. See also Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
supra note 30, 3-16.
53. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 26-112
(separate/dissenting opinions of Judges Bedjaoui, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Ajibola and Judge ad hoc El-
Kosheri).
54. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 26-28 (separate
opinion of Judge Lachs).
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political (the role of the Security Council) and that which is legal (the role of the
International Court of Justice).
In terms of the Lockerbie case, and issues of state-sponsored terrorism
generally, the distinction is of paramount importance. As the more states are
labeled "sponsors of terrorism," the more these two competing roles will clash. As
opposed to merely seeking to punish individual perpetrators of terrorist acts, it has
become apparent post-September 11 th that States and their respective regimes
accused of sponsoring terrorism will also be likely targets of action resulting from
initiatives taken under Security Council Chapter VII powers. Building upon the
quotation included at the beginning of this section, how will the Security Council
deal with accused States' legal challenges brought under any number of treaties to
which both the accused State and the accuser State are parties? Will that in turn
provide for actions contrary to those sanctioned by the Security Council under
Chapter VII?
Judge Bedjaoui's dissenting opinion55 also maintains a focus on the political-
legal dichotomy between the roles of the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice, referring to a creation of a "'[g]rey area' in which powers may
overlap and a jurisdictional conflict comes into being. ' '56 Judge Bedjaoui eludes to
one of the underlying dilemmas in this so-called "grey area" when he includes
quotes from the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros in the case of the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa):
'[c]ertain 'limitations on the powers of the Security Council are necessary because
of the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international
situation can be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even
where it is really too remote genuinely to constitute one. Without these
limitations, the functions of the Security Council could be used for purposes never
originally intended ... [There was] no threat to peace and security other than such
as might be artificially created as a pretext for the realization of ulterior
purposes.'57
The question is thus reiterated: to what lengths can member state(s) of the
Security Council go to politically pursue an issue of international concern (as
opposed to a genuine threat to international peace and security which would give
the Security Council leave to invoke its Chapter VII powers), despite legal avenues
in place provided for in treaties to which the states at hand are both parties?
Additionally, to what lengths can accused States pursue legal action in the
International Court of Justice before the Security Council in essence ties that
55. See generally Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 33-49
(dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui).
56. Id. at 35.
57. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(Southwest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (S. Afr. v. Namib), 1971
ICJ 16 (June 21) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui; dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, quoted in
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30).
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State's hands with binding action under Chapter VII authority?
In response to recent events of global state-sponsored terrorism, the author's
answer should come as no surprise. As Judge Bedjaoui states in his dissent:
[t]he most that can be said is that if the person that committed the offense acted as
the organ of a State, the [Montreal] Convention could prove to be, not
inapplicable, but rather ineffectual to the extent that the state that would opt not
for extraditing but for prosecuting the suspects itself, which, obviously, would not
be a satisfactory solution.
58
The Montreal Convention is indeed an ineffective means of dealing with
state-sponsored terrorism generally, not to mention the extradition of state-
sponsored terrorists from their homeland. As stated in the Security Council's most
recent resolutions on the subject, terrorism, in all forms, poses a threat to
international peace and security - a threat of such extreme proportions, which if
proven, should be combated in the political sphere by the international community
with whatever means necessary. 59 The Security Council, if not the international
community at large, has opted for Chapter VII-authorized political solutions over
more time-consuming legal alternatives °60
IV. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REACTIONS TO THE TERRORIST ACTS OF
SEPTEMBER 1 ITH
The day after the September 11 th attacks, the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 1368 (2001).61 While Resolution 1368 espoused an
appropriate level of outrage in response to the terrorist events that transpired the
day before, it in essence constitutes a more strongly worded restatement of
Resolution 1269 (1999), which stopped short of referring to international acts of
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. 62 Seventeen days after the
September 11 th terrorist attacks against the United States, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1373 (200 1).63 An analysis of Resolution 1373 reveals that it
provides for the freezing of assets linked to terrorists, terrorist organizations, or
states supporting the activities of terrorists.64  This built-in sanction against
terrorist organizations and the states or entities that provide them with support
seemingly represents a building upon the sanctions lodged against Libya after the
Lockerbie bombing. Incorporating Security Council Resolutions 1269 and
Resolution 1368 in name and substance, article 1, paragraph (d) of Resolution
58. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30 at 37 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Bedjaoui).
59. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), para. 3; See also
S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56'h Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), para. 7.
60. See S.C. Res., supra note 59.
61. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56"h Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
62. See S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54"' Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1269 (1999).
63. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59, at 1-5.
64. Id. at 2 (note use of the positive term "shall" as opposed to more ambiguous term
characteristic of other United Nations' documentation regarding terrorism).
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1373 speaks directly to the international dilemma of state sponsored terrorism:
Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, Decides that all
States shall... Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources...
available.., for the commission of terrorist acts...65
Additionally, article 3, paragraph (c) and (d) call upon all States to
"[c]ooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and
agreements.. ." and to "[i]ncrease cooperation and fully implement the relevant
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council
Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (200l).y ' 66 As stated above, Resolutions 1373,
1377 (2001), 1378 (2001), 1383 (2001), 1386 (2001) and 1390 (2001), Security
Council Resolutions 1269 and 1368 perpetuate the contradictory dichotomy
between the calling upon states to cooperate in and implement international anti-
terrorist conventions while simultaneously expressing the Security Council's
"readiness to take all steps necessary to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations...
Read in conjunction with Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and
1192, there is a discernable philosophical pattern regarding how the Security
Council intends to treat state-sponsored terrorist incidents. 6 This evolving pattern
of both philosophy and proposed action (viewed together with Security Council
steps taken in response to the Lockerbie bombing) may indeed signify a
crystallization process of international customary law regarding international
responses to state-sponsored terrorism in general, and necessarily the extradition of
nationals from a state proven to be a sponsor of that national's terrorist activities.
It is also apparent that with it's acknowledgement of state-sponsored terrorism in
Resolution 1373, the Security Council may no longer view the reliance upon, or
formulation of a requested state's defense based upon, the provisions set forth in
the Montreal Convention as applicable to extradition proceedings where a national
of a terrorist-sponsoring state is sought to be extradited for alleged terrorist
activities.
V. CONCLUSION
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192 set a
precedent for the avoidance of having to negotiate the jurisdictional quagmire
posited by the Montreal Convention. Rather, via Article 24 of the United Nations
Charter, the Security Council can formulate resolutions that take precedence over
well-established multilateral treaties. This fact leaves United Nations Member
65. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59, at 2.
66. Id. at art.3.
67. See generally S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 62; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 61.
68. See generally supra note 9, at 1-5; S.C. Res. 731, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748 supra note
9, at 1; S.C. Res. 883 supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at I.
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States with little or no recourse in the International Court of Justice, as exemplified
by the plight of Libya in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing. 69 Security Council
Resolution 1373 and its progeny further enforce the precedent established by
Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192. Resolution 1373 appears to
deny terrorist-sponsoring states the right to prosecute their accused nationals at
home, despite a call for States to "[i]ncrease cooperation and fully implement the
relevant conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.. .,,.70 In light of the
threats of international terrorism, the continued investigation of the September
11 th attacks and an analysis of future Security Council action will likely be highly
determinative in the possible crystallization of customary international law
regarding international responses to transborder acts of terrorism, inclusive of the
extradition of alleged terrorist nationals seeking refuge in their own terrorist-
sponsoring countries.
The United Nations Security Council, in light of both the bombing at
Lockerbie and the attacks of September 1 th, is in essence doing away with the
need for international anti-terrorism conventions, such as the Montreal
Convention. These anti-terrorist conventions are meant to foster cooperation
between states in matters regarding acts of international state-sponsored terrorism.
The principle of international law that States are not obliged to extradite their own
nationals, aut dedere aut judicare, is seemingly at odds with the current
conventions on terrorism if the requested government in question itself supports
terrorist activities of the nationals accused. Under the guise of combating and
preventing international acts of terror, the precedent being set by the United
Nations Security Council is that a State can levy sanctions, use military force, or
merely enter an accused country and take the individuals sought in connection with
terrorist acts; thus bypassing the conventions already in place as well as the
principle of state sovereignty with regard to the extradition of accused international
terrorists. Yet, when an accused terrorist-sponsoring State seeks legal relief in the
International Court of Justice as prescribed by treaties to which all states are
parties, there is no obligation to adhere to the treaty in light of binding Security
Council action taken under Chapter VII authority.
Adopted in the intervening period between the Lockerbie bombing and the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, Security Council
Resolution 1269 has served as the foundation for the Security Council's most
recent actions taken in response to international terrorism. 71  Resolution 1269
establishes a dichotomy - which begins to customarily appear in subsequent
Security Council resolutions regarding international terrorism - between the role of
the Security Council as the champion and protector of the principles of the United
Nations Charter and the body's role as an encouraging facilitator among member
States in the implementation of international conventions.
Accordingly, Resolution 1269 states in part that the Security Council is
69. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 24.
70. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59.
71. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 67.
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"[d]etermined to contribute, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
to the efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms. . ." Yet in a preceding clause, the
Security Council supports "[t]he efforts to promote universal participation in and
implementation of the existing international anti-terrorist conventions, as well as
to adopt new international instruments to counter the terrorist threat...,7 If these
two roles of the Security Council are in fact mutually-exclusive, it stands to reason
that international law fostered by the Security Council, if not the international
community in its entirety, is both conflicted and confounded. This confusion
regarding the implementation of action by the Security Council, namely whether
the Security Council will act in an arguably ultra vires capacity or in accordance
with standing international anti-terrorism conventions, has affected both the
political and legal aspects of the extradition of alleged international terrorists.
In the wake of the September 1 th terrorist attacks in the United States, the
United Nations Security Council built upon Resolutions 731, 748, 883, 1192 and
1269 by adopting Resolutions 1368 , 1373 , 1377 , 1378 , 1383 , 1386 , and
Resolution 1390 . Security Council Resolution 1373 calls for the implementation
of positive and definitive action regarding the prevention of terrorism and the
punishment of any individual, entity, or state which has a hand in assisting,
financing, or committing an act of terrorism. 74  In light of Resolution 1269,
Security Council Resolution 1373, albeit indirectly, further calls into question the
ability of the Montreal Convention to govern the extradition of international state-
sponsored terrorists. It does so by simultaneously and confusingly referring to the
principles of the United Nations Charter while calling upon states to implement
treaties applicable to acts of international terrorism.75
72. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 67, at para- 5.
73. Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for
Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation, supra note 1, at 2;
74. See id.
75. Id. at 2-5.
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